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FORTY-FIVE MINUTES THAT CHANGED THE 
WORLD: THE SEPTEMBER DOSSIER, BRITISH 
DRAMA, AND THE NEW JOURNALISM
GEORGE POTTER
September 24, 2002. Just over a year after the attacks of 9/11 and 
just under two weeks after US President George W. Bush implored 
the United Nations to take a stand against Iraq, the British Labor 
government released a dossier analyzing Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities. On its surface, the dossier presented no 
new information of significance, as much of the intelligence col-
lected was culled from United Nations reports and other public 
documents, though, as former Sunday Telegraph executive editor 
Con Coughlin writes, “British intelligence had never before been 
asked to produce a public document, and the authority of British 
intelligence had never before been called upon to justify govern-
ment action” (2006, 245). As it turns out, this public justification 
would not go as British intelligence would have liked because of 
two primary problems. The first problem came when the dossier 
claimed that Iraq had sought “significant quantities of uranium from 
Africa”—a claim that would cause much debate in the United States 
after Bush repeated it in his 2003 State of the Union Address—and 
the second came with the assertion that Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) could be ready for attack within forty-five 
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minutes (Blair 2002). The latter of these allegations was particularly 
stressed in Britain because Prime Minister Tony Blair highlighted 
it in his foreword to the dossier, writing, “The document discloses 
that his [Saddam Hussein’s] military planning allows for some of 
the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them” 
(2002). Interestingly, though, Coughlin notes in American Ally, his 
analysis of the relationship between Blair and the American pres-
idency, that what the dossier actually claimed Iraq could do with 
those WMD was more nuanced:
What it said, in two separate and distinct items, was first, that “some 
of the WMD” could be ready “Within 45 minutes of an order to use 
them,” and second, that Iraq was attempting to build a ballistic mis-
sile that had a range capable of hitting Cyprus, as well as a number 
of key American military bases in the Gulf region. At no point did 
the dossier say that Iraq had the capability to fit WMD warheads to 
its missile systems. The forty-five minute intelligence related solely 
to battlefield munitions, such as mortars and rockets, although this 
was not explained in the dossier . . . Such distinctions, however, did 
not seem to unduly concern Downing Street in the autumn of 2002. 
(Coughlin 2006, 248–49)
Nor did such distinctions concern the British press, which drew a 
linear connection between WMD and ballistic missiles. Nowhere 
was this more pronounced than at Rupert Murdoch’s The Sun, which 
ran the headline, “Brits 45 Mins from Doom,” along with a photo of 
tourists at a beach resort in Cyprus and the lead, “BRITISH service-
men and tourists in Cyprus could be annihilated by germ warfare 
missiles launched by Iraq, it was revealed yesterday” (Pascoe-Wat-
son 2003). Though The Sun hardly represents a venue for hard news, 
“even the distinguished defense correspondent of the Times, which 
was widely regarded as Britain’s newspaper of record, offered a sim-
ilar report, writing that Saddam’s missiles could hit British military 
bases in Cyprus in just forty-five minutes” (Coughlin 2006, 248).
This turned out to be incorrect. After eight years of war in Iraq 
with no substantial WMD discovered, we know that Iraq would not 
have been able to carry out a WMD attack on Kuwait City, let alone 
Cyprus. In Britain, where skepticism toward the invasion of Iraq 
always ran high, it did not take long for the claims of the September 
Dossier, as it came to be known, to be dissected.1 On May 29, 2003, 
Andrew Gilligan, then defense correspondent for the BBC, filed a 
report claiming that the dossier had been “sexed up” and that “the 
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government probably knew that that 45 minute figure was wrong, 
even before it decided to put it in,” as well as arguing that Alastair 
Campbell, Blair’s then Director of Communications and Strategy, 
had pushed for the inclusion of the forty-five minute claim (Gilligan 
2003). In fact, Coughlin writes that “both the French and German 
intelligence agencies had access to material similar to that of SIS 
and CIA on Iraq, and government officials in Paris and Berlin were 
well aware that the more lurid claims being made about Saddam’s 
WMD capability in the British press could not be substantiated by 
the known evidence” (Coughlin 2006, 246–47) and that
this particular piece of intelligence was treated with a degree of deri-
sion by the CIA, where George Tenet, the director, took to calling 
it the “they-can-attack-in-forty-five-minutes shit.” The CIA had 
strong reservations about the reliability of the new SIS agent who 
had provided the intelligence in the first place, and warned London 
not to rely too heavily on the new information. (Coughlin 2006, 249)
Likewise, the forty-five-minute claim, as it turns out, relied entirely 
on one source with no direct access to Saddam Hussein or his closest 
advisors. (Coughlin 2003).
Unfortunately, Gilligan’s reporting also relied solely on a single 
Downing Street source, Minister of Defense employee and former 
UN weapons inspector David Kelly. Kelly claimed that his informa-
tion to Gilligan did not substantiate all of Gilligan’s claims about the 
dossier and had his name made public before committing suicide in 
July 2003 (Spencer 2003), around the time Robert Novak was nam-
ing Valerie Plame, setting off a parallel, though slower developing, 
scandal in the United States.2 In the end, this series of events, one of 
many narratives surrounding the Iraq war and the intelligence that 
enabled the war, would lead to the August 2003 Hutton Inquiry in 
Britain, an attempt to explore Kelly’s death that also engaged pre-
war intelligence and the reporting of the BBC. And it is with the 
Hutton inquiry that dramatic historiographies of the nascent Iraq 
War began to make their way to the British stage, and, in particu-
lar, the debate over the forty-five-minutes claim stood before a new 
judge: theatrical audiences.
The first of these engagements came through the play Justify-
ing War: Scenes from the Hutton Inquiry, one of many Tribunal plays,3 
which stage trials and inquiries in Britain, performed by the Tricycle 
Theatre in recent years. Justifying War, which premiered on October 
30, 2003, less than two months after the Hutton Inquiry finished 
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hearing testimonies, is composed entirely of direct quotes from the 
transcripts of the Hutton Inquiry, which was not aired on televi-
sion, though limited witnesses were allowed into the galleries (Nor-
ton-Taylor 2003). Nearly a year later, on September 1, 2004, David 
Hare’s Stuff Happens opened. While not nearly as focused as Justify-
ing War—Stuff Happens takes a multinational and longer view of the 
lead-up to the Iraq War—Hare’s play does also engage the debate 
over the inclusion of the intelligence about the forty-five-minutes 
threat (Hare 2004). Additionally, because Hare’s work mixes public 
quotations with fictionalized scenes of backroom conversations, his 
play provides an alternative and complementary view of the debate 
showcased in Justifying War. Taken in tandem, the two plays provide 
a dynamic method to examine the works that Peter Preston, in a 
less than positive take on documentary theater in Britain, referred 
to as “the new journalism,” while, at the same time, helping to estab-
lish a counter metanarrative for the representation of the failure 
of journalism in fictional British drama, such as in Colin Teevan’s 
How Many Miles to Basra? (Preston 2004). However, as will be seen 
when these plays are placed into an analysis of critical historiogra-
phy and ethnographic performance, as discussed by theorists such 
as Hayden White and Dwight Conquergood, they do not inherently 
solve the problems of journalistic representation, but, instead, pro-
vide an alternative slant and realm of criticism to that in more tradi-
tional forms of journalism. Through this analysis of three genres of 
Iraq War drama—a verbatim play, a fictionalized docudrama, and a 
wholly fictional play—in Britain, the specific challenges to the inter-
section of art and journalism can be more closely examined. Specif-
ically, it appears that British theater, while providing a more critical 
venue for analyzing the narration of the Iraq War, became a parallel 
monolith for a singular narrative of the War that did not create a 
sufficient replacement for a reliable and rigorous press.
THE WRITING OF HISTORY
In recent years, much has been written about documentary and ver-
batim theatre within the United Kingdom, from placing it within 
the context of trends in contemporary British theatre (Innes 2007; 
Lane 2010) to discussions with artists (Hammond and Steward, 
2008) to explorations of the form in the context of democracy (Chou 
and Bleiker 2010) and human rights (Derbyshire and Hodson 2008). 
With the 2016 release of the Iraq war inquiry, which claimed both 
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that Tony Blair exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein 
and that British intelligence produced “flawed intelligence,” the dis-
cussion of Iraq war intelligence has again moved toward the center of 
British politics (“Chilcot” 2016). However, no study has specifically 
examined how the depiction of Iraq war intelligence moved across 
different forms of documentary drama and into fictional theatre. In 
fact, Stuff Happens is the only play here that has received sustained 
critical attention, most likely because it also had the most sustained 
and covered run of any of the productions, though this coverage has 
often tended to focus more on the representation of diplomacy than 
the representation of Iraq intelligence. Despite this, Stuff Happens 
is only one part of a trend that stretched across a number of British 
dramas engaging the intersection of the Iraq War, British intelli-
gence, and the media.
Before considering the plays themselves, a brief examination of 
critical historiography is appropriate in order to situate the works 
ideologically, as well as historically, particularly considering the bat-
tle over pre-war intelligence, whether it be played out at 10 Downing 
Street, the BBC, the Hutton Inquiry, or London theater, serves as 
a reminder of Fredric Jameson’s claim that “interpretation is not an 
isolated act, but takes place within a Homeric battlefield, on which 
a host of interpretive options are either openly or implicitly in con-
flict” (1981, 13). While in this quote, Jameson is primarily concerned 
with literary interpretation, his metaphor presents a stark reminder 
of the violence that remains always-already a part of historiography, 
and, in particular, those historiographies that engage contemporary 
political discourse, especially that discourse meant to create a literal 
battlefield through its interpretation(s) of intelligence texts. But the 
debate over the forty-five minutes occurred not simply because of 
the fallacy in the intelligence, nor the fallacy in the reporting of the 
intelligence, but because coverage of those fallacies itself also con-
tained inaccuracies. The historical moment, not just the plays or the 
newspapers, presents a chance to examine what history is in the first 
place. As Hayden White notes in his study of historical narrativiz-
ing, The Content and the Form,
In order to qualify as historical, an event must be susceptible to at 
least two narrations of its occurrence. Unless at least two versions of 
the same set of events can be imagined, there is no reason for the his-
torian to take upon himself the authority of giving the true account 
of what really happened. The authority of the historical narrative 
is the authority of reality itself; the historical account endows this 
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reality with form and thereby makes it desirable by the imposition 
upon its processes of the formal coherency that only stories possess. 
(White 1987, 20)
If White is right, that dissonance is the nature of historiography and, 
by extension, that coherence only exists in myth, then what should 
surprise us is not that Tony Blair didn’t know exactly what was going 
on with the WMD in Iraq or that Andrew Gilligan didn’t know 
exactly what was going on at 10 Downing Street—or that I, perhaps, 
have little knowledge what either were ever thinking—but that the 
public would ever invest such credence in their attempt at intelli-
gence/journalism/historiography. Unfortunately, though, we live in a 
world that likes its absolutes, that does better swinging between the 
extremities of utter truth and utter fabrication than exploring the 
grey areas between. Given this tension between competing narra-
tives and the desire for simple stories, the question to ask of the New 
Journalism of the theater is perhaps not whether or not it is more 
accurate than the Old Journalism of print and television, although 
that might be a fair starting question, but whether the theater pro-
vides a space for a more critical historiography than the Old Journal-
ism, and whether Justifying War and Stuff Happens attempt to create a 
metahistory of the intelligence that preceded the Iraq War.
STAGING TESTIMONY
As to the first of these questions, accuracy, Justifying War rests safely 
on the fact that the text of the play is taken from the transcripts of 
the Hutton Inquiry, making the source of the dialogue easily verifi-
able. In fact, the development of works of verbatim theater became 
a specialty of Northern London’s Tricycle Theatre, where Justifying 
War played, under artistic director Nicolas Kent. Though Justify-
ing War did not receive as much domestic attention as The Color 
of Justice (1999) or international attention as Guantánamo: ‘Honor 
Bound to Defend Freedom’ (2004), it ran for a month in fall 2003 
to consistently positive reviews in the Tricycle’s 235-seat theater. 
However, what audiences saw during this run was a very shortened 
rendition of the inquiry. The Hutton Inquiry heard testimony for 
twenty-five days, while Justifying War had an initial run-time of ap-
proximately two-and-a-half hours, raising the question of how the 
testimony was shaped and what kind of impression of the debate 
over the forty-five minutes and the BBC coverage the play presents 
(Billington 2003).
George Potter | ESSAYS 237
First and foremost in any such analysis of documentary drama 
that contains contemporary figures, it is worth considering the 
effects and ethics of performing a living person. As Dwight Con-
quergood writes in “A Sense of the Other,”
Performance of another living person’s story is a humbling and para-
doxical experience. When the ethnographer becomes performer, he 
or she comes closest toward entering the world of the other, while 
being aware simultaneously that he or she will never be that other. 
The reach through performance towards grasping the meaning of 
“the other” always falls short and must be attempted with humility. 
(Conquergood 1983, 154)
Although this kind of attempt at humility and striving for “accu-
racy” is difficult in any context, it might be even more difficult in 
the political context that works such as Justifying War and Stuff Hap-
pens explore than in the more traditional ethnographic framework 
that Conquergood writes about. This is both because the kind of 
extended, less guarded interviews that ethnographers aim for are 
more difficult inside political circles, and because the performance 
of political figures can more easily fall into facile caricatures, since 
their public lives always-already exist as hyperreal performativity.4 
Despite these risks, Charles Spencer noted of the original London 
production of Justifying War that,
William Chubb is possibly more persuasive than the man himself 
as Andrew Gilligan, Kenneth Bryans leaves little doubt that Geoff 
Hoon is a cold, calculating buck-passer, David Michaels scarily 
captures the pent-up fury and menace of Alastair Campbell, while 
Roland Oliver presents Andrew Mackinlay MP as a positively Dick-
ensian figure of furious self-importance. (Spencer 2003)
Similarly, Michael Billington, in his Guardian review, writes, “Un-
emphatically staged by Nicolas Kent and containing particularly 
good performances from Roland Oliver as Mackinlay, David Mi-
chaels as Alastair Campbell and William Hoyland as Dr. Jones, 
this is in no sense kangaroo-court theatre” (2003). Whether good 
acting and good performance of another person are inherently the 
same remains an open question. However, it would appear that, at 
least in the initial run, the performances of Justifying War attempted 
to create the play’s characters, regardless of their individual politics, 
with respect and dignity.
What becomes equally interesting to consider is the sequencing 
and selection of events in the play, which, like the actual hearing, 
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begins with a one-minute moment of silence (Fisher 2003). As the 
above quotes also indicate, the three focal presentations are those 
of Andrew Gilligan, Alastair Campbell, and Janice Kelly, the widow 
of David Kelly. The first of this trio to appear in the play is the one 
who interviewed David Kelly as an anonymous source in the first 
place: Andrew Gilligan. Initially, the questioning presented in the 
play presents an analysis of Gilligan’s reporting on the September 
Dossier, with Gilligan answering a question regarding his interview 
with Kelly by noting, “Well I was surprised [that Kelly had mentioned 
Campbell] and I said: What, you know, Campbell made it up? They 
made it up? And he said: No, it was real information but it was unreli-
able and it was in the dossier against our wishes” (Norton-Taylor 2003, 
15). Later, Gilligan remains equally pointed while giving a summary 
analysis of the dossier, declaring, “So there are inconsistencies in this 
document; and in all cases it was the harder—the firmer statement, 
that they actually had weapons rather than just the ability to pro-
duce weapons. Those are the statements that make it into the exec-
utive summary, into the Prime Minister’s foreword” (Norton-Taylor 
2003, 16). Through such statements, Gilligan attempts to position 
himself as a meticulous and accurate reporter. However, when the 
content of his original BBC broadcasts comes up, the direction of the 
inquiry shifts: “Well, I never returned to the form of words I used 
in the 6.07 broadcast,” Gilligan responds when asked if he withdrew 
the allegation that the Labour government willfully misrepresented 
information before Kelly died. “Subsequent broadcasts were scripted. 
The word I used in the 7.32 broadcast, the scripted one, was ‘question-
able,’ which I am happier with” (19). But a journalist cannot remove 
his words from public debate, even with a retraction, and the play 
underscores this by showing Gilligan’s testimony ending with Gil-
ligan shifting the responsibility for the turmoil in Kelly’s life back 
to Kelly: “I mean, I think he was pretty experienced at dealing with 
journalists; I cannot speculate on what Dr. Kelly may have felt but 
he was experienced with journalists” (22). Through such moments, 
Gilligan’s historiography, as presented in the play, shapes a narrative 
in which Gilligan appropriately used a source in search of the truth, 
though with little remorse over the end results for that source. Camp-
bell, though, would have a harsher take on Gilligan’s reporting.
In fact, Campbell takes on the BBC directly in the section of the 
inquiry presented in the play, first claiming, with more than a bit of 
political flair, “Our perception was that BBC viewers and listeners 
were at times being given a sense of moral equivalence between the 
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democratically elected governments that were involved on one side 
and the Iraqi regime on the other” (Norton-Taylor 2003, 44). Addi-
tionally, regarding Gilligan’s May 29, 2003, report, Campbell tells 
the inquiry,
I was torn, really, because on the one hand, I did not imagine any-
one would have taken them terribly seriously, because it is such an 
extraordinary thing to say, that the Prime Minister and the Gov-
ernment would do that. Given my close involvement in the produc-
tion of the dossier, I knew the allegations to be false. The reason 
why I then got more concerned as the day wore on was because 
shortly after the Prime Minister spoke to British troops when we 
were in Basra it was clear to me that the traveling press party were 
frankly more interested in this BBC story than they were in what 
the Prime Minister had been saying to the troops and his visit to 
Iraq. (Norton-Taylor 2003, 44–45)
Through moments such as this, the play not only displays Campbell 
directly contradicting Gilligan—a standard moment of courtroom 
drama—but also shows Campbell later arguing that the government 
had to release Kelly’s name in order to counter the bad reporting by 
the BBC, thereby laying Kelly’s death squarely at Gilligan’s feet. In 
fact, Campbell’s political calculating is scripted so starkly that his 
end statement of sympathy for Kelly, especially depending on how 
an actor plays it onstage, rings severely hollow: “I just wanted to say 
that I think, like everybody, I have found it very distressing that Dr. 
Kelly who, was clearly somebody of distinction, had died in this way 
and obviously I have, like everybody I am sure has thought very, very 
deeply about the background to all this. So I think all I would say is 
that I just find it very, very sad” (48). Regardless of the merit of such 
a statement, the play does present a dual perspective on Gilligan’s 
coverage of the September Dossier, as well as the actual information 
presented in it, and it leaves the decision as to which man to trust to 
the audience. As Jenelle Reinelt writes, “Justifying War is sometimes 
gripping the way courtroom drama is always engaging: it challenges 
its audience to weigh up the evidence and decide” (2004, 67).
Or it would, if not for ending with Janice Kelly’s testimony, the 
one testimony that breaks the chronological order of the actual Hut-
ton Inquiry (Taylor 2003). Likewise, while Janice Kelly’s testimony 
serves, in structural terms, as the end of the play, it also provides the 
play’s personal face and moral center, since Kelly stands outside of 
the backdoor binary of the BBC and Downing Street testimonies. 
Instead, she reminds the audience of the experience of someone 
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without the clout of Gilligan or Campbell, when she tells of her hus-
band’s name being made public: “Well, he did not know about it 
until after it had happened. So he was—I think initially he had been 
led to believe that it would not go into the public domain. He had 
received assurances and that is why he was so very upset about it” 
(Norton-Taylor 2003, 88). Additionally, while Gilligan and Camp-
bell both retained their jobs at the time of their testimonies, Janice 
Kelly’s testimony stands as a reminder of why the inquiry had been 
called in the first place, and of the loss to her family, when she states, 
of the last day she saw her husband, “Oh, I just thought he had a 
broken heart. He looked as though he had shrunk, but I had no idea 
at that stage of what he might do later, absolutely no idea at all. He 
could not put two sentences together. He could not talk at all” (92). 
Certainly, this moment struck home the hardest to the critics. Paul 
Taylor, in his Independent review, wrote,
The painstaking verisimilitude of the staging, with its plasma 
screens flashing up all manner of documents, is matched by the doc-
umentary accuracy that even reproduces the fluctuating drift in the 
voice link-up with Mrs Kelly. A virtue of dramatic reconstruction is 
that it can alert you to details that fall through the net in day-to-day 
newspaper coverage. I shall never forget the brief, harrowing silence 
at the other end of the line before Mrs. Kelly, hitherto steady and 
stoic, confirms that the painkiller her husband used was the medica-
tion that she takes for arthritis. (Taylor 2003)
Likewise, Charles Spencer noted in The Daily Telegraph, “As we listen 
to the testimony of Kelly’s wife Janice at the end . . . we are made 
keenly aware that the fascinating insight into public affairs afforded 
by the Hutton Inquiry was the result of a desperate personal trag-
edy” (Spencer 2003).
The reordering of Janice Kelly’s testimony certainly struck a 
powerful blow that could be read as an arch and manipulative move 
on the part of the play’s creators, but for the comment that Spencer 
ends his review with: 
Campbell became a man dangerously obsessed, the BBC should 
have clarified Gilligan’s reporting while backing the substance of his 
claims, and the process by which Kelly’s name became public was a 
sick farce. But Kelly himself doesn’t seem to have behaved entirely 
honourably either, and I suspect his awareness of the fact was one 
of the chief reasons for this decent and distinguished man’s lonely 
death. (Spencer 2003)
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It would seem that, despite the emotion of the final scene, the in-
tellectual argument—that the government and the media failed in 
the lead-up to the Iraq War—remained clear, and perhaps was even 
reinforced by reminding the audience that the cost of political mal-
feasance is always personal pain, regardless of the terms of the pub-
lic debate.
BETWEEN FACT AND FICTION
Along with Gregory Burke’s Black Watch, David Hare’s Stuff Happens 
is one of the two most commercially successful plays about the Iraq 
War to come from Britain—and perhaps elsewhere in the world. 
Stuff Happens opened on September 1, 2004, in the National The-
atre’s main Olivier Theatre. Future productions would eventually 
play at the Mark Taper Forum in Los Angeles (2005) and the Public 
Theater in New York City (2006), as well as in many other countries, 
leading Jay M. Gibson-King to write that the play has “become part 
of the canon of contemporary British theatre” (2010, 151).
While Stuff Happens provides ample material for discussion, this 
analysis will necessarily limit itself to the single scene in which the 
forty-five-minutes controversy presents itself. Before turning to this 
scene, though, a few distinctions between Stuff Happens and Justify-
ing War should be made clear. First, Hare’s play takes the entirety 
of the lead-up to the Iraq War as its focus, moving between diplo-
mats and heads of state in America, Britain, France, and elsewhere 
over a period of nearly two years leading up to and just after the 
invasion of Iraq. Additionally, Hare’s play does not consist entirely 
of verbatim theater. Instead, Stuff Happens combines excerpts from 
public speeches with dramatized backroom conversations between 
real politicians and monologues from fictional characters, placing 
Stuff Happens at the center of the triangle that Fanshen, Plenty, and 
The Permanent Way make in the Hare oeuvre. Of course, in choos-
ing to write scenes where the dialogue is unknown, Hare adds to 
the ethical dilemmas involved in performing another person, and 
some actors did easily fall into caricatures of those they portrayed 
on stage.5 Critic Gerald Berkowitz, for one, found this to be the 
case most pointedly, though perhaps not surprisingly, in the perfor-
mances of the US politicians at the original London production:
Like too many Europeans, he [Hare] presents President Bush 
(played by Alex Jennings) as simply an ignorant buffoon, while oth-
ers, particularly among the Americans, are allowed to come across 
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as cartoons. Vice President Cheney (Desmond Barrit) and Defence 
Secretary Rumsfeld (Dermot Crowley) are practically foaming at 
the mouth as hawks, while Condoleezza Rice (Adjoa Andoh) is a 
pushy—one might almost say uppity—woman constantly interrupt-
ing conversations to explain what the President means to say. (Ber-
kowitz 2004)
It would seem that distance makes the heart grow satiric. Certainly, 
this seemed to be Ben Brantley’s take upon watching the differences 
in the New York and London productions of Stuff Happens: “Mr. Sul-
livan [the director] appears to have encouraged his cast members, 
most of whom play multiple roles, to use their imaginations to draw 
characters taken from real life in deeper, more realistic detail, avoid-
ing the editorial cartoon sneers and snarls of many of their London 
counterparts” (Brantley 2006). Returning to Conquergood’s state-
ment that “Performance of another living person’s story is a humbling 
and paradoxical experience,” it’s worth considering that taking the 
living person’s words away and replacing them with the playwright’s 
might also risk removing the actor’s anchor to a humble portrayal 
of that person, regardless of personal politics. At the same time, in 
watching the two productions, the British audience seemed to find 
the British characters, who also had exaggerated accents, more com-
ical—particularly Tony Blair’s inability to stand up to the Ameri-
cans—and the Americans more menacing. Likewise, the American 
production was also more critical of Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
the presumptive hero of the play, particularly when Powell’s French 
counterpart questions his motives, first by implying that the United 
States will not join the International Criminal Court because it is 
protecting Henry Kissinger, then by telling Powell, “You can’t play 
football and be the referee as well,” with regards to the Americans’ 
mixed messages over the efficacy of the United Nations.
Of course, the scenes Hare writes in Stuff Happens, those of shift-
ing political alliances behind closed doors on each side of the Atlan-
tic, represent historical events whose narratives will never exist in 
transcripts for any actor to work into a Tricycle-esque performance. 
Instead, Hare’s perhaps inevitable September Dossier scene begins 
with Tony Blair declaring, “Really! I mean, really! I mean, come on!” 
to Campbell, British Ambassador to the United States David Man-
ning, Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell, and Lord Chancellor Philip 
Bassett (Hare 2004, 62). Shortly thereafter, an intelligence spook 
reads an e-mail, noting, “Number Ten, through the Chairman of 
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the Joint Intelligence Committee, wants the document to be as 
strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This 
is therefore a last call for any items of intelligence agencies think 
can and should be included! Responses by 12:00 tomorrow” (62). 
After a few lines, Richard Dearlove, then head of the British Secret 
Intelligence Service, offers a new source, with a minor caveat: “It 
isn’t corroborated. (Dearlove shifts.) This is highly unusual. As you 
know, I don’t usually like to depend on a single supplier. There are 
procedures,” then, after a brief exchange, “We have a source who 
is saying that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or bio-
logical weapons within twenty to forty-five minutes of an order to 
do so” (63). The scene then transitions to a brief exchange between 
Blair and Manning:
manning: You asked for something. He brought it. That’s service, 
I suppose.
Blair considers the implications of this remark.
blair: It’s an instinct, isn’t it? It’s a feeling.
Everyone waits for his decision.
What did he say? “Twenty to forty-five”?
manning: Yes.
blair: Use Forty-five. (Hare 2004, 64–65)
After a few more lines, The Evening Standard declares “Forty-five min-
utes to attack!” while George Tenet refers to the claim as, “The ‘they-
can-attack-in-forty-five-minutes’ shit” (65). Interestingly, regardless 
of the accuracy of the scene that Hare creates, he still comes to 
the same resolution that Coughlin would paint in the book-length 
study American Ally two years later. At the same time, Hare lays the 
blame for the misuse of the intelligence squarely at the feet—or in 
the mouth—of Tony Blair, showing that it was the Prime Minister’s 
choice to include the forty-five-minutes intelligence. As such, the 
fiction of Hare’s play becomes the counterbalance to the missing 
Prime Minister in Justifying War. Additionally, the juxtaposition of 
public record and fiction within Hare’s play helps to throw the pub-
lic record and accepted “facts” into question. This is not to say that 
Hare stands without blame for any misrepresentations in his own 
text about Iraq intelligence, but, that, regardless of the verisimili-
tude in his creation of the debate over the forty-five-minute claim, 
the intelligence itself was, as George Tenet might say, shit. In the 
end, the scene would seem to ask who is telling the bigger fiction: 
Hare or Blair?
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Through this technique, Justifying War and Stuff Happens can 
stand as a necessary tandem in the discussion over the forty-five-min-
ute debate. Justifying War presents the unfilmed public record before 
the eyes of the audiences. Conversely, Stuff Happens attempts to shed 
light on the unseen private conversations of public officials. Unlike 
the Old Journalism of Andrew Gilligan, this forces the play to own 
up to the fictions of theater’s New Journalism. All of which would 
make for a nice excuse to abandon one’s newspapers and televisions 
in favor of the theater, if it were not for one small problem: the Hut-
ton Inquiry actually ended, and it released its findings.
PERFORMING IN A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE
On January 28, 2004, a slightly delayed final report from Lord Hut-
ton was made public, and it put more blame on the BBC than on the 
Labor government, noting that “the allegation reported by Mr. Gil-
ligan on 29 May 2003 that the Government probably knew that the 
45 minutes claim was wrong before the Government decided to put 
it in the dossier was an allegation which was unfounded” (Hutton 
2003). Despite this, during the hearing, Campbell’s “correspondence 
with [dossier author John] Scarlett was published, [and] it transpired 
that the language on the forty-five-minute claim had been strength-
ened at Campbell’s request, after he complained that it was ‘weak,’ ” 
and Campbell was compelled to resign before the Inquiry was even 
completed (Coughlin 2006, 344). Gilligan, as well as other members 
of the BBC hierarchy, would also lose his job over the revelations of 
the Hutton Inquiry. None of this information, though, is covered in 
either play.
There are many reasons for this. In the case of Justifying War, the 
findings of the Inquiry were released after the initial staging of the 
play, and the choice to only stage testimony precluded the possibility 
of staging any outside effects of the events inside the courtroom. 
Likewise, the events in the chronology of Stuff Happens, aside from a 
few stray connections to US policy toward Palestine near the play’s 
conclusion, end with the invasion of Iraq, thereby placing the Hut-
ton Inquiry outside of the domain of the play, though the Inquiry’s 
insights were available to Hare. Whether he believed such findings 
or sided with the numerous groups who questioned them is a whole 
other question. All of this, though, points to the fact that theater’s 
New Journalism—like New Labor’s relationship to Old Conserva-
tism—still has all of the same problems of the Old Journalism: the 
George Potter | ESSAYS 245
need to run important stories as soon as possible, even as new infor-
mation is constantly uncovered, bias, and a choosing of historical 
facts to shape a specific narrative, as Hayden White might say, that 
leads to a particular view of the present. This is not to say that the 
New Journalism is without value. Certainly, works such as Stuff Hap-
pens and Justifying War stand as important counterdiscourses to the 
hegemony of the state and mass media, particularly when that media 
is either state-owned or corporate. Interestingly, such a move would 
appear to parallel the conclusion to Janelle Reinelt’s study of British 
political theater After Brecht, where she writes,
Here, then, is the social challenge of history-at-this-moment: how 
to move forward into a new situation with renewed creativity and 
without giving up a sense of social justice and a vision of a better 
political order. Reenter agency, identity, and teleology—old-fashioned 
terms that may keep the Brechtian legacy alive and vital as the new 
historical formation takes shape. (Reinelt 1994, 209)
Certainly, Brecht’s counterdiscourses critiqued the assumptions of 
journalists and newspapers in his own time, but it seems danger-
ously facile to imply that theater can ever wholly replace politics or 
media, if for no other reason than that might lower the standard 
of politics and media, rather than encouraging both greater eth-
ics from those in power and greater skepticism from those viewing 
the power, a perpetual meta-stance. Perhaps most importantly, the 
New Journalism’s greatest trait comes from its meta-journalism, 
its attempt to point out the failings of the dominant narrative, to 
alienate audiences from the failings of media, politicians, and the-
ater. Few would doubt that Hare and Norton-Taylor selected and 
sequenced their play’s material for a variety of artistic and political 
purposes, not for the sake of a pristine journalism alone. As such, 
their works point to the same selections made by journalists and 
politicians every day, whether for ratings, votes, or the aesthetics 
of a feature story. And the work of these cultural authors should be 
equally scrutinized—their fictions and sequencings equally ques-
tioned—as those of the New Journalism, where no one assumes the 
accuracy sometimes, and troublingly, afforded politicians and news-
papers. Interestingly, though, within British drama, what Hare and 
Norton-Taylor helped to achieve was not a new mode of scrutiny 
for both British drama and journalism, but a counternarrative that 
would fuel much new fictional drama in Britain exploring different 
aspects of the “war on terror.”
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AN ALTERNATIVE MONOLITH
Among the first of these critical encounters with journalists on 
stage was Colin Teevan’s play How Many Miles to Basra? Although 
the work did not reach stage until it was performed at the West 
Yorkshire Playhouse in Leeds in September 2006, its original incar-
nation as a BBC Radio 3 production broadcast on July 11, 2004, left 
the markings of an adventure story for radio all over the play’s nar-
rative, even as the story is set beside a critique, presumably, of BBC 
Radio, as well as the broader BBC journalism hierarchy. The show’s 
month-long run in the 350-seat theater means that there was the 
opportunity for more people to see How Many Miles to Basra? than 
Justifying War, though its location outside of London means that the 
play invariably received less attention. However, that the critique of 
the media would move to wholly fictional productions beyond the 
capitol speaks to the pervasive nature of the concerns raised in the 
plays under discussion here.
The play tells the story of a group of four British Army sol-
diers, accompanied by an Iraqi translator and a BBC reporter, who 
travel on an unauthorized mission through Iraq in order to deliver 
blood money to a warlord in an attempt to make amends for killing 
three Iraqis at a checkpoint. By the end, all of the British soldiers 
are killed—the last by American F18 Hornets—but the journalist, 
Ursula, armed with an endlessly working digital recorder, lives to 
tell their story, or her perception of it. The narrative of the play is 
framed, and broken once in the middle, with Ursula’s encounters in 
her United Kingdom office, just after having returned from Iraq. 
And, as it turns out, Ursula’s return just happens to dovetail with 
the breaking of the September Dossier, as the office’s new secretary, 
Sophie, tells Ursula, after Ursula enquires into her boss Tariq’s loca-
tion and doesn’t understand why he would need to meet with the 
lawyers about the “sexing up”:
A source in the Intelligence Service told Andrew Gilligan that the 
Government asked Intelligence to sex up the dossier on Saddam’s 
weapon capabilities. And the Government then published the dos-
sier knowing it to contain false claims. And Andy went on air with 
it earlier in the week, and since then the place has gone mad. The 
Prime Minister’s office has been piling the pressure on the heads of 
departments, and so we’re having to go through everything with a 
fine-tooth comb. Even Tariq’s under pressure and he’d nothing to do 
with it. (Teevan 2006, 19)
George Potter | ESSAYS 247
While primarily serving as a plot device—this explanation pro-
vides the justification for Sophie’s cataloguing of Ursula’s record-
ings, the playing of which takes the play into flashback mode—the 
specific frame sets the tale of events on the ground in Iraq against 
a backdrop of media manipulations and misinformation back home 
in London. After all, if the government would “sex up” the reasons 
for getting into the war, why would it tell the truth about how the 
war was prosecuted? In fact, though the first act ends with a car 
bomb, predictably leaving the audience to wonder who survived, the 
moment of excitement is preceded by one of the soldiers, Freddie, 
telling Ursula, “Because all you lot are interested in is the story. And 
to make your stories suit your agenda, you have to have goodies and 
baddies. And the agenda dictates the army is always painted as the 
baddy. Yet we didn’t choose to be here” (Teevan 2009, 69). However, 
when the second act begins, it returns to the office, to a debate on 
the role of the media and a discussion of Andrew Gilligan:
ursula: Is Gilligan’s source not sound then?
tariq: Excuse me?
ursula: The “sexing up” claim.
tariq: Not my source. Not my story, I’m glad to say.
ursula: But now your problem?
tariq: You don’t give up!
ursula: A good journalist . . .
tariq: I understand from my colleagues that their source is reliable.
ursula: But do you think it is?
tariq: What I think is neither here nor there. I have no evidence 
that leads me to believe that my colleagues are anything other 
than committed to fairness, accuracy, and impartiality in all their 
reporting.
ursula: But you do suspect there’s an agenda?
tariq: Nor is what I suspect either here or there.
ursula: You’ve been with the lawyers too long. (Teevan 2009, 73)
Through such moments, the center of Teevan’s adventure tale of 
heroism and futility in the Iraq War returns to the controversy over 
how the war was justified, the fulcrum of the play resting on the 
same reports as the documentary work by David Hare and Rich-
ard Norton-Taylor. At the same time, what separates Teevan’s work, 
other than the fictional frame, is that his protagonist, Ursula, did 
not know the story back home, while she was out in the field chasing 
her own reports. Perhaps like many other reporters in the real world, 
she found her story on the ground caught between institutional and 
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governmental crosshairs that shaped themselves in a different con-
text than her actual reporting. Furthermore, the centrality of the 
debate over WMDs to the reception of Ursula’s reporting also makes 
an argument that there can be no conception of the war in Iraq in 
Britain that does not rest in the shadow of the forty-five-minutes 
claim, whether that shadow casts doubt over the government or 
restricts journalists’ ability to question that government. Either way, 
Gilligan’s sloppiness in uncovering the intelligence flaw left a dou-
ble-edged sword hanging over everyone. And, for Ursula, the cuts 
were inescapable.
In the second-to-last scene in the play, worth quoting at length, 
Ursula and Tariq debate their responsibility in how to portray the 
lives and deaths of the soldiers that Ursula followed through Iraq, 
and the nature of how the truth is shaped during a time of war:
tariq: The MoD issued a statement saying how these four service-
men died, under friendly fire, escorting three Bedouin through 
the British zone in order to deliver blood money to save a Bedou-
in’s family.
ursula: They shot three unarmed Bedouin dead.
tariq: The soldiers died heroes.
ursula: They were heroes, but—
tariq: One when the car went over a mine—
ursula: An unexploded American shell—
tariq: One presumed lost in a sandstorm—
ursula: After attempting to rape a journalist.
tariq: And the remaining two at the rendezvous which had been 
inadvertently arranged at an archaeological site Saddam had been 
using as a weapons dump.
ursula: Weapons dump? There were no weapons. It was a two-
and-a-half-thousand-year old body dump. And the Allies have 
just dumped more bodies on it.
tariq: Their story is largely true.
ursula: Apart from the bits that are blatant lies. Christ, isn’t it our 
job to report the truth?
tariq: But is the truth so simple—
ursula: No, it’s complicated, but just because it is complex, does 
not mean we should avoid it.
tariq: Your version tarnishes the reputation of four military heroes.
ursula: They were heroic, but in a much more human way. The 
public are not idiots. They understand moral complexity.
tariq: The discrepancies you wish to expose strip the men of the 
dignity the official version affords them. And the Government 
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would be only too happy to seize upon your contradicting of the 
official version of events to sidetrack us and the public from the 
real issues—
ursula: Which are?
tariq: Why we are there in the first place. That’s the greater truth. 
They lied to us. (Teevan 2009, 105-6)
Paralleling the fabricated narratives that the American Army 
promoted about Jessica Lynch and Pat Tillman, the passage explores 
the nature of memory, representation, and heroism during war, com-
plicating the idea of what it means to support soldiers and honor 
their memories in the face of the horrors and moral complexities of 
war zones. Ursula, like Hare in his portrayal of Powell challenging, 
but inevitably promoting, the Bush Administration policies, sees the 
soldier’s struggle, rather than their idealization, as the true hero-
ism, a story that at once promotes their bravery, while challenging 
the sensibility of the war they have been asked to serve in. Tariq, 
on the other hand, places the narrative complexity of the individ-
ual acts of soldiers below the greater cause of challenging the gov-
ernment’s justification for the war in the first place, the failure of 
the Labor government to resist the hyping of the war becoming the 
more important overriding narrative. However, one must also ques-
tion Tariq’s commitment to this idea of challenging the government, 
given that his news bureau, presumably, did not issue such challenges 
before the war, and his statement earlier that it is important to “be 
careful.” The question becomes one of whether Tariq truly believes 
in the importance of questioning the dissemination of information 
from the government, or merely follows the popular narratives of 
the time, focusing attention on the controversies that sell, rather 
than breaking any stories himself. In this narrative, then, Ursula 
becomes the heroic image of the crusading journalist, risking her 
life in the battlefield, and then challenging the bureaucracy back 
home in order to challenge the truth. Or does she?
As noted previously, one of the soldiers, Freddie, questioned 
whether Ursula truly cared about the truth of the soldiers’ experi-
ence, or was merely interested in pursuing a pre-conceived narrative. 
This assessment is a milder parallel to what Ursula herself says when 
Tariq begins talking about how strongly he believes in freedom of 
the press: “And you said three dead Brits and I could have top slot. 
I’ve got four” (Teevan 2009, 104). A line like this becomes one where 
delivery makes all the difference: does it get played as a desperate 
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last resort to Tariq’s need for a sensational story, or is it indicative of 
Ursula’s sensibility? Either way, it represents a desire to present her 
story at all costs, which once again puts the ethics of her profession 
on the table, as it seems fair to question where her crusading spirit 
was before the war. It also places her in the same position as Andrew 
Gilligan: breaking a story that ended up costing the lives of all of its 
sources, which also seems like a less than idyllic model of journalism.
Oddly enough, the play does not end in the newsroom, or even on 
the battlefield, but, instead, in the living room of the squad leader’s 
wife, Jeannie, in order to return some of Sergeant Stewart McDon-
ald’s belongings, as well as to give a copy of a recording of Stewart to 
Jeannie. In the scene, Ursula tells Jeannie,
I came here because—because perhaps you haven’t been told all the 
details surrounding the death of your husband. I went to Geordie’s 
mother. I had a tape of him reading a letter he had written to her. 
The letter was never passed on to her. I think because in it he admit-
ted killing a Bedouin at a checkpoint. I felt she should know the 
truth, but also that she should hear him tell her he loved her, which 
he hadn’t done since he left home. (Teevan 2009, 110)
Jeannie, plainly replies, “You have a great commitment to the 
truth,” stating shortly thereafter, “Please, I have to pick my chil-
dren up. I must get ready” (111). Though Jeannie does show gratitude 
when Ursula provides her with one of the recordings of Stewart, it 
becomes clear as the play draws to an end that Ursula’s search for 
the truth perhaps has more to do with her own needs than the lives 
of those she affects or any commitment to journalistic ethics. In the 
final measure, the noblest actions lay dead in Iraq, not alive in any 
Western newsrooms.
And this has been the new metanarrative for British theater 
moving forward. Not only are government officials held culpable 
for misrepresentations of intelligence, Muslims, or the Middle East, 
so are most journalists shown on stage with them. In Hare’s other 
play touching on Iraq, The Vertical Hour, when an American former 
journalist explains that she gave advice to President Bush on Iraq 
because of respect for the Office of the President, as well as sup-
port for the war, her boyfriend’s British father replies, “No doubt 
you feel that if your president calls, you have to answer that call. 
If my prime minster called, I’d let it ring. That’s the difference” 
(2006, 31). Whether or not this is actually how British journalists 
behaved before the war is another question, but it does setup the 
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moment, later in the play, when the father lectures the journalist, 
ticking off what he assumes she didn’t tell the president, such as 
“Drop bombs where you like” and “Manufacture intelligence from 
the most corrupt and dishonest elements in the country. Sanction 
torture,” before finally concluding, “You didn’t say, ‘It doesn’t mat-
ter if tens of thousands of people get killed, just so long as they’re 
not Americans’ ” (85). More recently, Steven Lally’s summer 2009 
production Oh Well Never Mind Bye at the Union Theatre portrayed 
journalists pulled among sensationalism, ignorance, and a bullying 
progressivism as they debate representations of the July 2005 sub-
way bombings in London and the occupation of Palestine, with the 
central debate involving the media misrepresentations—fueled by 
the British Police—of the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes.6 In 
the play, only one journalist wants to check to make sure the infor-
mation received from police reports is accurate before running it, 
while her colleagues push on ahead with the misinformation (Lally 
2009). Additionally, what the debate over Palestine referenced in 
Lally’s play underscores is that the need to question mainstream 
media and political narratives regarding foreign policy has not been 
diminished by social media or online news sources. In fact, more 
recent debates over the presence, use, and reaction to chemical 
weapons in Syria (Rigby and Pickard 2013) and the BBC’s coverage 
of the Israeli assault on Gaza in 2014 (Plunkett 2014) make it clear 
that a critical theater and media are still strongly needed in the face 
of more hegemonic voices.7
Meanwhile, what began as an attempt to create a New Journal-
ism on stage, has, particularly with the cross to fictional dramas, 
developed into a condemnation of all journalism. In all of the plays 
examined here, there are very few good individuals. Perhaps, to 
paraphrase Ursula, the writers believe that the audiences are capa-
ble of understanding moral complexity. However, there also seems 
to have been a juxtaposition of narratives, from the threat that Iraq 
posed to a distrust of any journalistic and governmental informa-
tion. While this skepticism is, likely, a less dangerous framework 
than attempts at manufacturing war, it begs the question of whether 
the plays are attempting to raise an alternative set of questions and 
explore truth, or are merely providing an alternative monolithic 
dissemination of information. After all, the idea that no journalists 
or government officials can be trusted—or that this should be rep-
resented through strikingly similar sequences of events in multiple 
works—also presents a homogenous and filtered narrative in pursuit 
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of a static political agenda. The question remains as to what lies on 
the other side of this mass skepticism, in a world where some mea-
sure of facts is still needed in order to construct ideology, policy, and 
art. True, in the face of New Labor’s failure, perhaps any alternative 
narrative was needed. However, theatrical questionings of fact are 
no substitute for a reliable press, and the questions laid out on the 
British stage, as the recent News of the World scandal indicates, still 
remain present and pressing. Perhaps, in the end, alternative nar-
ratives and skepticism on stage are much easier to construct than 
journalistic or political integrity.
NOTES
1  This should not be confused with the equally problematic February Dos-
sier or “Dodgy Dossier,” which plagiarized multiple sources, particularly 
graduate student Ibrahim al-Marashi.
2  On July 14, 2003, Robert Novak named Valerie Plame as a CIA agent in 
his column for The Washington Post, scuttling her career with the CIA. 
Many saw this as an attempt on the part of the White House to exact 
revenge on her husband, former diplomat Joe Wilson, for critiquing Bush 
Administration policies.
3  Among other Tribunal plays are Bloody Sunday (2006), about the Saville 
Inquiry into the shootings of protesters in Derry, Northern Ireland in 
1972, and The Colour of Justice, about the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.
4  Interview-based performer Anna Deavere Smith noted the same of her 
attempt to conduct interviews in Washington, D.C., “[It] was a place . . . 
where people rephrased my questions a lot” (Quoted in Cheakalos 2000, 
188).
5  It’s worth considering if this risk—and perhaps the structural imbal-
ance—are why the Tricycle Theatre chose not to perform any of Tony 
Blair’s testimony to the Hutton Inquiry.
6  Menezes, a Brazilian national, was shot in a London subway station on 
July 22, 2005, the day after a failed attempt at another subway bombing. 
In the aftermath, there were many reports about suspicious behaviors 
and clothing, though the 2008 inquest would later reveal that police had 
not even shouted a warning before firing on Menezes.
7  As I complete revisions on this article, Britain is still responding to the 
Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war, making it likely that the debate over 
the entry into the Iraq war, the intelligence used to justify the war, and 
the media coverage will be thrust back center stage. In fact, Richard 
Norton-Taylor and Matt Woodhead decided to preempt the report, stag-
ing the play Chilcot at the Battersea Arts Center in June 2016, one month 
before the report’s release.
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